he/she makes an examination report and presents it to the Commission. After reviewing the report of the examiner and the opinion/report of the examinee, the Commission makes a final decision as to whether any laws have been violated. If a violation is duly recognized, the KFTC will impose corrective measures such as surcharges or a cease and desist order while referring some cases to the prosecution. If the examinees are not satisfied with the verdict of the committee, then they can bring the case to court (for more information about the KFTC, visit http://eng.ftc.go.kr/).
The history of antitrust law is short since Korea had experienced a "state-led economy" for a long time. A rule about cartels was introduced on December 31, 1986 and there was a first case of cartel fines in 1988. Two important amendments of the Fair Trade Act were made in April 2007 with effect from July 14, 2007 . First, auction and bid rigging practices became a type of cartel under the Act. Second, the leniency program is introduced to encourage cartel members to inform on their cohorts. The Act allows the KFTC to reduce surcharge penalties on such informers. When it was introduced, the rate of leniency for the first informant was 75%. After the maximum leniency increased to 100% in 2005, the cartel cases with leniency have been growing, as can be seen in Figure 1 . either reducing the likelihood of a case being filed or the financial damages resulting; it also could be viewed -in the current regime of amnesty/leniency programs -as price-reductions occurring due to cartel members defecting leading to a case filing (hence a possible reverse causality here -with cartel collapse leading both to a price decline and a case being filed). Research on US, European and German antitrust has found some evidence of deterrence effects of price-fixing investigations, with effects declining over time. Feinberg (1980) presented a simple theoretical model suggesting that past enforcement for a firm or in an industry would lead to subsequent pricing effects, assuming that higher prices bring more antitrust scrutiny and that past antitrust cases increase the likelihood of high prices being confronted by a new antitrust case; in a cross-section of 288 US firms, regression analysis finds that past cases lead to a lower Lerner Index [(p-mc)/p]. Feinberg (1986) examined effects of both German and EU antitrust cases on both producer price indexes and profit margins in that country -evidence is found of relatively short-term deterrence effects but little long-term impact. Sproul (1993) , however, found no significant impact of U.S. antitrust enforcement on subsequent prices.
III. Pre
In studies of a particular industry, Block et al. (1981) found evidence of negative impacts on markups above cost in the US white bread industry of increased antitrust enforcement resources, while looks at producer price index movements in 5 industries subject to US Antitrust investigations, finding significant price reductions due to the case filings in 4 of these. Clarke and Evenett (2003) In several papers, Connor (2004 Connor ( , 2006 Connor ( , 2008 has found evidence of significant financial sanctions imposed by the US and foreign antitrust authorities, but the limited degree to which these offset cartel overcharges. He argues that the deterrence effect of these sanctions will be limited unless fines are increased as a share of affected commerce and the overcharges themselves. However in his work, as in much of the empirical literature on antitrust deterrence, what is actually examined is the magnitudes of fines (and sometimes jail sentences) and civil damages imposed -assuming (possibly correctly) that increasing penalties will translate into more deterrence; but, it has also been suggested that probability of detection and conviction and not magnitude of penalties is what will deter cartel activity the most. At best, however, this is quite an indirect approach to deterrence, and what seems preferable (though often more difficult due to data limitations) is the more direct look at cartel occurrence or price effects due to antitrust enforcement.
Bergman (2008) discusses a variety of methodologies which have been used recently in assessing competition policies, noting a small number of econometric studies of price effects of mergers and a larger number of such studies of cartel effects on prices, but little in the way of econometric analysis of competition authority anti-cartel impacts. Connor (2007) exhaustively surveys these studies of cartel price effects, finding a median of 770 average price effects estimated in the studies to be 25%. Werden (2008) finds this number to be somewhat high and takes as a more reasonable figure a 10% price effect for US criminal cartel prosecutions. But, again, these are estimates of the effects of the cartels detected -whether the antitrust case reversed entirely the price effects on consumers is merely assumed, not shown. Clearly though, quantifying the magnitude of consumer gain from anticartel efforts --though most likely substantial -is quite difficult.
Two types of deterrence studies can be conducted -looking only at firms/products involved and testing for impacts; the other is looking across all firms/products and testing for differences between the two groups -in this study we attempt to do both. This allows us both to compare investigated companies and industries with others and to observe effects over time within those investigated.
IV. Methodology
Given that the first anti-cartel fines in Korea were issued only in the late 1980s, it would not be expected that deterrence would be observed for at least several years beyond that. We start our analysis in 1990 (through 2013), and undertake two closely-related reduced-form econometric studies. First, we explain the impact of antitrust enforcement on producer prices in a pooled sample of up to 884 product and service categories for the years 1990 through 2013. Second, a firm-level study will be conducted explaining profit-margins and return on investment;
in this study, we attempt to distinguish the effects of antitrust cases against others in the industry from effects against the firm in question. For the first study, the regression specification is a panel data model:
where PPI it is the producer price index for product i in year t (indexed at 2010=100) and explanatory variables are macroeconomic variables (an economy-wide price deflator and real GDP) to capture cost and demand pressures, as in Feinberg (1986) --INF t and RGDP t --plus a series of dummy variables representing lagged (both to allow for time for pricing decisions to be made and to deal with possible endogenity of a case filing) antitrust case filings (one year, twoto-five year, and six-to-ten year lagged), ATR -1 , ATR-2-5 , and ATR -6-10 . We allow productspecific fixed effects (which should capture market structure and other product-heterogeneity issues) as well as product-specific responses to cost and demand movements.
The firm-level study explaining profit-margins and return on investment will allow us to incorporate both firm and industry-specific antitrust measures to study whether deterrence is achieved by "demonstration" or "neighboring" effects of cases against others in the same industry. Two specifications are used to test the deterrence effects on firm profitability.
The first includes short, medium, and long-run "direct effects" (ATR -1 , ATR-2-5 , and ATR -6-10 ) all together as well as "neighboring effects" on the other firms in the same industry (NEIATR -1 , NEIATR-2-5 , NEIATR -6-10 ):
Profitabiltiy ti = a i + bX it + cATR -1 + dATR-2-5 + eATR -6-10 + fNEIATR -1 + gNEIATR-2-5 + hNEIATR -6-10 (2) where X it includes total assets as a share of sales (TA), advertisement expenditures relative to sales (AD), market share (MS), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE). The NEIATR variables are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if a firm has not been convicted for cartel activities but belongs to an industry where there has been any cartel case in the time period considered. Market share is calculated as a share of sales in the industry level not in the product level. The variable SIZE takes 1 if a firm is classified as a large firm in terms of the number of employees (more than 300).
The second approach is the so-called "pulse effects" difference-in-difference model. The periods of event vary across firms and the effects vanish after some periods (so it looks like pulse). 3 The short, medium, and long-run effects are separately estimated and a variable indicating the industry with cases (INDATR) as follows:
Profitabiltiy ti = a i + bX it + cATR -1 + dINDATR -1
The industry -level case dummy INDATR has a value of one if any firm in an industry has experienced anti-cartel actions in a given period, zero otherwise. A firm which was convicted for cartel has one for both ATR and INDATR while the other firms in the same industry has zero for ATR and one for INDATR. In equations (2) and (3), year and firm dummies are also included.
The sum of coefficients c and d is the direct effect (to the convicted firm) while d is the neighboring effect compared to the firms belonging to the industries where no firm has been convicted.
V. Data

Anti-cartel case records
We collected and compiled anti-cartel cases obtained from the KFTC. There are 305 cases where 1857 firms are involved (some of the firms are investigated more than once and double-counted). The KFTC documents provide other details about the case such as duration of collusion, residence, amount of fine (which we may make use of in future extensions of this research).
PPI and macroeconomic variables
The Bank of Korea compiles a monthly producer price index series which covers 884 items, comprising 801 products and 83 services. In the regression we used the PPI in 288 moreaggregate categories since some of the collusion cases covered two or more items and the share of products with no involvement in cartel cases is too large in the detailed item-level classification.
Two alternate measures, real GDP (RGDP) and the index of industrial production (IP), are used to represent the overall state of the economy. Real GDP covers the entire period of PPI data but it is only available quarterly. Industry production index is provided monthly but only from 2000, therefore we have tried both measures. Inflation (INF) is the rate of change in consumer prices which are compiled by Statistics Korea, the national statistics agency.
Firm profitability
Financial statements of the firms are obtained from KIS (Korea Information Service)
which collects and provides information about companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange and registered on the KOSDAQ market. Of course, returns calculated from accounting data are different from economic profits. For robustness we tried three measures of firm profitability.
Gross profit margin (GPROFIT) is calculated as (sales -cost of sales)/sales. If we assume constant marginal costs or use average variable costs as a proxy for marginal costs, then GPROFIT can be similar to the price-cost margin (or Lerner Index) since sales=P*Q and cost of sales=c*Q.
Operating profit margin (OPROFIT), which is the ratio of operating income to sales, and return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of operating income to total assets, are the other two measures. The firm level financial data is matched with anti-cartel case records and firm-and industry-level incidence of antitrust cases are constructed. Control variables which may affect the rate of returns are the total assets to sales ratio (TA), advertising expenditure to sales ratio (AD), and market share (MS).
VI. Estimation Results
We first estimate equation (1) for the entire sample period (1989 to 2013) (using RGDP as the overall demand proxy) and for the 2000 to 2013 period for which monthly IP data are available. 4 For both we report results with random product effects, first restricting macroeconomic effects on product prices to be constant across industries and then allowing them to be industry-specific. These are shown in Tables 2 and 3 . In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 we see no significant impact of antitrust cases on product prices over the full time period, but a 6.3 percent price reduction in the year after a case, when the sample starts in 2000 (a period in which antitrust enforcement has become increasingly stringent in Korea). In Table 3 Turning now to the firm-level regressions, Table 4 presents results for both equations (2) and (3) explaining return on assets -restricting the analysis with firms above $100,000 in sales.
6
Of the control variables, we see that higher market shares translate into larger ROA while more advertising-intensive firms have lower ROA (the latter result may be related to consumer vs.
producer good differences in profitability). Consistent with the PPI results, we find a short-run negative impact of antitrust cases affecting the particular firm and (somewhat smaller) a shortrun negative "neighbor" effect as well. Table 5 presents comparable results for the gross profit margin. Again we find a shortterm firm-specific negative impact of antitrust, though a surprising positive "neighbor" effect. In results not reported here, we fail to find significant effects of antitrust on operating profit margins.
VI. Conclusion
While these results are still somewhat preliminary, they are consistent with previous work suggesting that long-term deterrence is unlikely to be observed from antitrust investigations, though short-term price (and possibly profit margin) impacts may be expected. They are also consistent with the view that the major impact of careful enforcement of anticartel policy may be an economy-wide regime effect of lower prices resulting from a more competitive environment; however, these regime effects are difficult to document. 
